The European Union will only remain a serious actor in the Indo-Pacific if it treats the region not as an afterthought, but as a central theatre of its external action. That requires something more than a list of principles or a collection of ad hoc initiatives. It calls for a coherent, flexible strategy that grows out of European interests and values, yet is firmly anchored in the realities, priorities, and sensitivities of Indo-Pacific partners. Such a strategy has to be both overarching and fine grained: able to frame the EU’s broad approach to the region and, at the same time, tailored to specific subregions, issue areas, and countries.
To move from slogans to impact, the Union needs to translate general aims into clear objectives, workable instruments, and concrete benchmarks that allow for regular review and correction. That external adjustment must go hand in hand with internal reform. Without changes in how the EU defines its role, takes decisions, and mobilizes instruments, even the best regional strategy will remain underpowered. The following reworked analysis sets out how the EU can rethink its place in the shifting international system and then turn that reflection into a more substantive Indo-Pacific policy.
A changing international landscape and the Indo-Pacific as a key arena
The return of Donald Trump to the White House in January 2025 has reinforced a trend that was already visible: the international system is moving further away from a simple US-dominated order. Yet what is taking shape is not the balanced, rules-oriented multipolarity that many Europeans once hoped for. Several power centres now coexist, but their competition often corrodes rather than strengthens multilateral rules and institutions.
The major powers are not primarily engaged in jointly reinforcing global governance or universal norms. Instead, leaders such as Trump, Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, and Narendra Modi tend to think in terms of large geopolitical spaces in which great powers dominate their surroundings. The old notion of spheres of influence has returned, dressed in twenty-first century language but still based on hierarchy and exclusion. Each major actor strives to create a relatively self-contained ecosystem and to manage, or even close off, access by other powers.
Where these spheres overlap, the risk of tension or armed confrontation grows. The South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and conflicts around Myanmar illustrate how quickly local disputes can be sucked into wider strategic rivalries. Similar dynamics are visible elsewhere: Russia’s war against Ukraine, China’s posture in the East China Sea, or even rhetorical gestures such as claims over Greenland or discussions about the Panama Canal point to a pattern in which large states claim special prerogatives over their respective neighbourhoods.
In such a setting, the Indo-Pacific is not a neutral backdrop. It is one of the core stages on which the evolution of this more fragmented order will be decided. Yet the governments of the so-called “peripheral” states in the region are far from passive spectators. Many of them refuse to be drawn neatly into one camp or another. Rather than choosing unequivocally between Washington and Beijing, they adopt forms of hedging or multi-alignment. They diversify their economic, technological, and security ties, engage pragmatically with multiple partners, and try to avoid strategic dependence on any single great power.
For these states, maintaining room for manoeuvre is the essence of national strategy. They cultivate parallel relationships, exploit competition among outsiders when it serves their interests, and seek to insulate themselves as far as possible from shocks emanating from great-power rivalry. A central element of these hedging approaches is the search for additional partners who can broaden their options. In that sense, the EU can occupy a structurally attractive place in regional calculations, provided it behaves as a predictable and capable actor rather than as an occasional visitor.
The global environment thus produces both dilemmas and openings for the Union. On the one hand, geopolitics and geo-economics are increasingly intertwined, exposing Europe to external pressure on trade, technology, and security. The termination of USAID programmes in parts of the Indo-Pacific under a second Trump administration is only one example of how US policy shifts can leave gaps in regional governance and development support. On the other hand, such withdrawals create space for the EU to offer its own brand of partnership and to reinforce its image as a supporter of multilateral rules, effective institutions, and sustainable development.
The linkages between European and Indo-Pacific theatres are already very tight. China’s growing footprint in Europe and in its immediate neighbourhood, including investment, infrastructure projects, and political influence operations, ties EU debates directly to Asian dynamics. North Korea’s involvement in Russia’s war against Ukraine further underlines that security developments in one region reverberate in the other. For that reason alone, treating the Indo-Pacific as a distant concern is no longer possible.
Against this backdrop, the EU needs to clarify how it sees its own role and then organise its instruments in a manner that matches those ambitions. The rest of this reworked text follows that logic: it first addresses the Union’s role conception and overarching foreign policy thinking, then turns to more specific recommendations for its Indo-Pacific engagement.
Recasting the EU’s role and foreign policy grand strategy
The intensifying rivalry between the United States and China in the Indo-Pacific does not simply narrow the space for other actors. It also creates a window in which the EU can present itself as a partner that offers alternatives to binary choices. This does not imply neutrality between democracy and authoritarianism, but it does mean designing policies that support regional autonomy instead of forcing states into exclusive alignments.
To do that credibly, the Union has to move beyond vague self-descriptions as a “normative power” and spell out in concrete terms how it wants to act in the world, what it is willing to invest, and which risks it is prepared to take. A durable presence in the Indo-Pacific presupposes a more coherent grand strategy at home.
- Rethinking the Union’s place in the world and shaping a realistic yet ambitious grand strategy
The current international order confronts the EU with a stark choice. Either it treats power politics as an unavoidable dimension of its external action and adjusts accordingly, or it continues to muddle through and becomes a secondary arena in which other actors pursue their agendas. So far, the Union has often been reactive rather than anticipatory. It has tended to underestimate the speed and depth of shifts in global power relations.
Internally, procedures and habits have not helped. Multiple overlapping standards and regulations, heavy administrative procedures, the absence of a single, authoritative foreign policy voice, and the predominance of endless consultations among national capitals have produced a system that is slow to respond. Enlargement debates have absorbed political energy that might otherwise have gone into sharpening the Union’s external posture. In this environment, strategic documents are sometimes drafted and adopted without sufficient political backing or implementation capacity, which turns “strategy” into a ritual rather than a guiding framework.
Yet the EU does possess considerable latent power. Its market size, regulatory influence, scientific base, and experience in institution building give it tools that most actors do not have. The problem is not capability in the narrow sense, but the lack of a shared political project that mobilizes those capabilities for clear external aims. A serious grand strategy would have to start from an honest inventory of the Union’s interests, values, and vulnerabilities and link them systematically to instruments in the foreign, security, and economic domains.
Such a strategy would not be a rigid blueprint. It would instead act as a compass that helps prioritize among theatres, distinguish between essential and secondary interests, and align resources accordingly. In the Indo-Pacific context, this means deciding what kinds of presence and engagement are indispensable, which partnerships deserve priority, and where the EU is willing to incur costs in defence of its principles.
- Making strategic autonomy the backbone of EU external action
The idea of strategic autonomy has been debated for years, often in emotionally charged terms. Yet the underlying intuition is straightforward: Europe should be able, when necessary, to act on its own, while cooperating with partners whenever that is possible and preferable. Initially associated mostly with defence questions, the notion has gradually expanded to cover economic resilience, technological sovereignty, energy security, health, and critical infrastructure.
If strategic autonomy is to guide the Union’s grand strategy, it cannot remain an ambiguous slogan. Member states and EU institutions need to agree, at least in broad terms, what it means in practice. Does it imply the ability to carry out certain military operations without US support. Does it require control over specific technologies and supply chains. Which domains are indispensable for autonomy, and which can remain more interdependent. Without a clearer conceptual core, the term risks becoming so elastic that it loses operational value.
In the longer run, moving towards genuine strategic autonomy will probably require further integration. A more federal organisation, with greater competences at the European level in areas such as defence industrial policy, external economic measures, and critical infrastructure protection, would make it easier to act with the necessary speed and coherence. Otherwise, every serious move will remain hostage to ad hoc bargaining among national governments with diverging threat perceptions.
The alternative is uncomfortable. If the EU does not shape its own strategy, it will be absorbed into the strategies of others. In a world where major powers use trade, technology, and security guarantees as levers, remaining merely an economic giant without commensurate political agency exposes Europe to continuous pressure. Strategic autonomy, properly understood, is therefore not a luxury, but a condition for defending the Union’s interests and preserving its capacity to make meaningful choices.
- Reforming decision making in foreign and security policy
A grand strategy is only as effective as the decision making that supports it. In the Common Foreign and Security Policy, unanimity has often allowed single member states to block joint action, slow down responses, or water down positions to the point of irrelevance. By contrast, economic and environmental policies have long relied on qualified majority voting, which has made those areas more dynamic and responsive.
For external action to be more than declaratory, the EU should move foreign and security policy decisions gradually towards majority voting, at least for certain categories of measures. This would not erase national interests, but it would prevent narrow concerns from systematically paralyzing the common position. The existing legal tools that allow for limited use of qualified majority voting in foreign policy have proven too constrained to solve this problem; more profound treaty-level change would likely be required.
If such comprehensive reform remains out of reach in the short term, an intermediate path would be to establish flexible formats in which a group of member states that are willing and able to deepen cooperation can do so without waiting for complete consensus. The Eurozone offers one model. A core group could apply tighter coordination and more ambitious instruments in areas such as sanctions implementation, maritime deployments, or economic security measures in the Indo-Pacific, while others could join later when domestic politics permit.
- Building a principles-based hedging strategy for the Union
The broader environment in which the EU operates will remain marked by strategic competition, even after individual leaders leave office. For that reason, strategic autonomy should be seen not as a one-off project, but as a long-term orientation. One way to advance it, particularly in relation to the US-China rivalry, is to adopt an explicit hedging strategy at the European level.
In this sense, hedging does not mean equidistance between Washington and Beijing. Rather, it refers to a deliberate attempt to maintain cooperation with both where interests coincide, while gradually reducing excessive dependence on either, especially in critical sectors. It involves keeping channels open, using both cooperative and deterrent tools, and preserving flexibility of response.
What would distinguish a specifically European hedging strategy is that it would be anchored in normative commitments. The Union would remain firmly aligned with other democracies on core issues such as human rights, rule of law, and territorial integrity, while still engaging selectively with authoritarian states on issues of shared concern. Depth and breadth of cooperation would reflect the degree of normative convergence. With like-minded partners, such as Japan, Australia, South Korea, or Taiwan, relations could be dense and comprehensive. With semi-authoritarian or authoritarian regimes, collaboration would be narrower, more transactional, and subject to clearer red lines.
Designing hedging in this way would force the EU to clarify how it balances values and interests and how it sequences engagement with different partners. It would also provide a more consistent framework for cooperation with regional organisations, development banks, and other forums where a mix of democratic and non-democratic actors interact.
III. Strengthening the Union’s weight in the Indo-Pacific
Once the EU’s role conception and grand strategy are clearer, they must be translated into regional approaches. The Indo-Pacific is a good testing ground because it combines economic dynamism with complex security tensions, and because most regional governments themselves practice variants of hedging and multi-alignment.
- Reducing strategic risks through Indo-Pacific partnerships
Managing exposure to both China and the United States is one of the central challenges for Europe. A reflex to compensate for tensions with Washington by deepening economic dependence on Beijing would be short-sighted. It would weaken Europe’s bargaining position, erode its credibility as a defender of a level playing field, and risk hollowing out strategic sectors if subsidized imports were allowed to overwhelm local industries.
A more sustainable path is to diversify economic links and critical supply chains by treating Indo-Pacific partners as key providers and co-developers in areas such as critical raw materials, semiconductors, and green technologies. Recent progress, for example the conclusion of a trade agreement with Indonesia after many years of negotiation, shows that this is possible when political will and technical persistence come together.
The next step is to revive the ambition for a comprehensive EU-ASEAN trade agreement. If that proves too complex in the short term, additional bilateral deals with individual Southeast Asian states can be designed in a way that they are later combined into a broader regional framework. Convergence of core provisions across these agreements is essential if they are to serve as building blocks towards a more integrated economic space.
Beyond trade agreements, the Union needs to engage more actively with major trans-regional arrangements such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. Its absence from key trade and investment frameworks dilutes its influence over standard setting and limits its firms’ opportunities in rapidly growing markets. While full membership may not be immediately realistic, closer alignment with CPTPP rules and structured dialogues with its members would signal seriousness.
At the same time, the Global Gateway Initiative has to become more visible and impactful in the Indo-Pacific. In principle, it offers an alternative source of infrastructure financing and connectivity projects that emphasise sustainability, transparency, and local benefit. In practice, procedures are sometimes too heavy, and certain governance standards do not always fit local administrative realities. Streamlining application and oversight processes without abandoning fundamental safeguards would make projects more attractive. Communicating very clearly what has already been achieved for local communities is just as important.
The Union also needs to think beyond the current financing horizon of Global Gateway. Announcing at an early stage that the initiative will be extended beyond 2027, and laying out a multi-year pipeline of projects in the Indo-Pacific, would give partners confidence that the EU is in the region for the long term, not merely as a temporary counterweight to other initiatives. Coordination with like-minded infrastructure programmes, such as those of India or Japan, is essential to avoid duplication and competitive fragmentation among partners that should, ideally, reinforce each other. In some cases, even limited practical coordination with Chinese projects will be inevitable if the goal is to maximise developmental benefits for local societies.
- Turning to an outside-in perspective
For much of its history, the EU has been strongest when exporting internally developed rules and norms. That inside-out reflex remains valuable, but in the Indo-Pacific it has to be tempered by a more outside-in logic. Instead of starting from what the Union wants to promote, policymakers should begin with a serious effort to understand what different partners in the region need and expect.
This means listening carefully well beyond government circles: to business communities, local administrations, civil society, and academic networks. It also requires the Union to resist the temptation to simply transpose European solutions onto very different social and political contexts. European values need not be renounced, but their translation into cooperation projects should reflect local constraints, cultural specificities, and political sensitivities.
The 2021 Indo-Pacific strategy was an important first attempt to define such an approach. However, the war in Ukraine has drawn political attention back to Europe’s immediate neighbourhood and has often overshadowed implementation in Asia. The potential that was identified in the strategy has not yet been fully realised. Re-energising that agenda involves not only more frequent visits and higher funding envelopes, but also a more patient effort to align EU initiatives with regionally defined priorities such as maritime connectivity, climate resilience, pandemic preparedness, and digital transition.
- Supporting regional efforts to uphold a rules-based order
Regional organisations in the Indo-Pacific vary in strength and mandate, but many of them play a significant role in maintaining channels of dialogue and reducing tensions. ASEAN, despite all its internal differences and limitations, remains a central node in regional diplomacy. It convenes a range of forums that bring together states which otherwise rarely meet in constructive settings.
If the EU wants to be seen as a serious supporter of rules-based regionalism, it needs to invest consistently in ASEAN centrality and in related institutions, including those addressing security questions. This does not mean romanticising the “ASEAN Way”. Consensus-based decision making and a strong emphasis on non-interference make it difficult for the organisation to respond robustly when rules are violated. But dismissing ASEAN’s methods outright would be counterproductive. A more useful approach is to work from within, encouraging gradual shifts towards more preventive diplomacy and stronger implementation mechanisms, while respecting the association’s own pace and norms.
Cooperation with countries like Australia, Japan, India, and South Korea within ASEAN-led forums, as well as through parallel formats such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, offers opportunities to strengthen maritime norms, promote confidence-building measures, and support crisis management arrangements. In doing so, the EU can bring its own experience of cooperative security and multilateral law-making to the table.
The year 2027, marking half a century of EU-ASEAN dialogue relations, provides a natural focal point for upgrading the relationship. Beyond ceremonial summits, the anniversary should be used to organise dense programmes of exchanges among officials, experts, and societal actors in fields ranging from climate policy and digital regulation to education and migration. At the same time, the Union should intensify efforts to gain a seat at the annual East Asia Summit, which has become an important arena for strategic dialogue. Upcoming ASEAN chairmanships by close EU partners such as the Philippines and Singapore offer diplomatic openings that should be used smartly.
- Showing up, listening seriously, and managing side effects
Presence counts in diplomacy. For Indo-Pacific partners, it is not enough that the EU publishes strategies and occasionally sends high-level delegations. What matters more is whether European representatives participate regularly in regional meetings, follow through on announced initiatives, and remain engaged even when crises elsewhere capture headlines.
Most states in the region, particularly in Southeast Asia, can be described as “swing states” in the current geopolitical competition. They do not want to choose sides and have no interest in being lectured by distant actors that appear mainly when they need votes in international forums. For the Union to be considered a credible partner, it has to abandon any residual paternalism and treat these countries as political equals with their own complex domestic debates and foreign policy traditions.
One recurring criticism from Indo-Pacific diplomats is that Europeans talk extensively about democracy and human rights, but do not always pay sufficient attention to the historical trajectories and institutional specificities of their partners. The point here is not that the EU should downgrade its normative agenda, but that it should display greater curiosity about the local path of political change and accept that reforms may unfold more slowly or in different sequences than they did in Europe.
Sanctions and restrictive measures remain necessary tools in response to grave violations of international law or human rights. Support for local civil society should continue to be a pillar of EU external action. However, both types of instruments can have unintended consequences beyond the target country. Some of the sanctions adopted after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, for instance, contributed to economic strains in third states that were already suffering from high energy and food prices. When those harms are not properly acknowledged or mitigated, they can push governments closer to alternative partners such as China, which presents itself as less intrusive.
If the EU wants to avoid that dynamic, it must calibrate its measures carefully, consider flanking support for affected societies, and communicate transparently about its motives and expected impacts. It should also be cautious not to promise more than it can realistically deliver in terms of investment, market access, or security engagement. Reliability, even in modest projects, often carries more weight than spectacular announcements that never materialise.
Another dimension that requires more attention is the extraterritorial effect of EU internal regulations. Rules designed to raise standards within the single market, for instance on sustainability or due diligence, can impose heavy administrative burdens on exporters from developing Indo-Pacific economies. If these partners are unable to comply, they may simply divert trade towards markets with less demanding requirements. Anticipating such effects and providing targeted technical assistance can mitigate resentment and keep the Union’s normative agenda from being perceived as a disguised protectionist instrument.
- Developing security and defence cooperation under a Team Europe banner
Security tensions in the Indo-Pacific are acute, particularly at sea and in contested border areas. Most US allies in the region continue to rely on Washington for hard security guarantees. At the same time, they are increasingly aware that this dependence can become a vulnerability if US domestic politics shift or if attention turns elsewhere. Many of them are quietly exploring what a “plan B” might look like, not as a replacement for the US alliance, but as an additional layer of security relationships that diversifies their options.
Europe will not become a primary military guarantor in East Asia. Geography, capability gaps, and domestic political constraints make such a role unrealistic. Still, the EU and its member states can contribute meaningfully to regional security if they position themselves as reliable complements to existing arrangements rather than as rivals to Washington.
A Team Europe approach in security and defence would combine instruments and experiences at the EU level with those of individual member states. It could include regular strategic dialogues with Indo-Pacific partners, joint training and capacity-building programmes for coast guards and navies, and participation in multinational exercises, including freedom of navigation operations where appropriate. Emphasis on maritime domain awareness, crisis communication channels, and rules of engagement at sea would respond directly to some of the most acute regional concerns.
European countries have also accumulated significant experience in dealing with hybrid threats, including cyber intrusions, disinformation campaigns, and pressure on critical infrastructure such as undersea cables. Many Indo-Pacific states face similar challenges, whether from state or non-state actors. Systematic exchanges of best practices, joint development of norms on responsible state behaviour in cyberspace, and cooperative efforts to secure critical infrastructure would allow both sides to strengthen their resilience. ASEAN-centred institutions, but also global forums such as the United Nations, offer arenas in which updated international norms in these fields can be discussed and codified.
- Deepening ties with key Indo-Pacific democracies
Several Indo-Pacific democracies occupy a special place in any European strategy for the region. Australia, India, Japan, and South Korea share with Europe a complex mix of dependence and vulnerability. They benefit from access to the US market and rely, to varying degrees, on US security guarantees. At the same time, they are exposed to American demands that link trade, technology, and defence in ways that can clash with their own interests.
Japan’s experience with Washington’s pressure on car exports, and Europe’s exposure to tariff threats and conditionality in the field of defence spending or support for Ukraine, illustrate how even close allies can find themselves squeezed. This situation creates a natural basis for closer coordination among democracies that wish to preserve an open, rules-based economic and security order rather than drift into blocs dominated by unilateral measures.
The EU-Japan relationship has already advanced significantly through an Economic Partnership Agreement and a Strategic Partnership Agreement. Cooperation on defence is being strengthened, including joint projects in advanced aviation technology with some European states. The Security and Defence Partnership announced in 2024 provides a formal roof but remains relatively general. The task now is to fill it with practical content, ranging from regular strategic consultations and horizon-scanning to joint initiatives in support of third countries, particularly in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands.
India occupies a somewhat different position. It is a major power in its own right, with a tradition of strategic autonomy and sometimes divergent positions from Europe on issues such as Russia. Nonetheless, it shares with the Union an interest in secure sea lanes, reliable supply chains, and a diversified technology base. Deepening engagement with India, including through trade and investment agreements, cooperation on digital regulation, and joint support for connectivity projects in South Asia and Africa, would reinforce the Union’s broader Indo-Pacific presence.
Australia and South Korea likewise offer important opportunities. The EU’s Security and Defence Partnership with Australia needs to be accompanied by an ambitious trade agreement that unlocks greater economic potential while reflecting societal concerns on both sides. With South Korea, cooperation in defence industrial production, technology development, and supply chain diversification can be intensified. Working with these countries in flexible minilateral groupings on specific issues, rather than always relying on large multilateral gatherings, can make action quicker and more targeted.
- Finding a credible balance between values and interests
One of the persistent tensions in EU foreign policy is the perceived gap between its normative rhetoric and its concrete behaviour. In parts of the Indo-Pacific, European language about “universal values” is sometimes heard as expressing a sense of superiority or as ignoring local historical experiences. Incautious remarks by European leaders that categorise the world into “gardens” and “jungles” have only reinforced that impression.
Rebuilding trust requires a more careful vocabulary and, above all, more consistent practice. Partners in the region do not necessarily object to European advocacy of democracy and human rights. Many share those aspirations. What irritates them is selective indignation and the perception that economic interests sometimes lead the EU to look away in one context while condemning similar behaviour elsewhere.
This problem is particularly visible in discussions about Russia and China. European governments justifiably expect Indo-Pacific partners to take a clear stance against Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and to support basic principles such as territorial integrity and non-use of force. At the same time, many of those partners note that the EU itself could speak more forcefully and systematically when China violates international law in maritime disputes or undermines political freedoms in places such as Hong Kong.
If the Union wants to be persuasive, it must defend the rules-based order wherever it is challenged, regardless of whether the violator is a geopolitical rival, an economic partner, or an ally. That does not mean uniform responses in every case, but it does mean avoiding double standards. Equally, the EU should not shy away from pointing out when Indo-Pacific partners themselves apply selective standards. Honest and respectful dialogue about such inconsistencies on all sides can help sustain a community of interest among states that, despite differences, depend on a functioning multilateral system.
- Telling a more compelling story about Europe in the Indo-Pacific
Policy is not only about what governments do, but also about how those actions are perceived. China has grasped this and invested heavily in narrative strategies, presenting itself as a champion of the “Global South”, a defender of multilateralism, and a provider of public goods, for example through connectivity initiatives launched in the early 2020s. The EU, by contrast, has often struggled to explain its role in clear, audience-specific terms.
If it wants to counter misleading narratives and highlight its genuine contributions, the Union needs to communicate in a more deliberate and imaginative way. That begins with gathering and presenting basic data on its economic, security, academic, technological, and cultural ties with Indo-Pacific countries. Those figures should be displayed in accessible formats that can be used by journalists, students, civil society groups, and policymakers in the region.
More importantly, EU-funded projects that produce visible benefits for local populations should be showcased in a manner that resonates with daily experience. Human stories, testimonies from beneficiaries, and straightforward explanations of how a particular project has improved transport, education, healthcare, or environmental conditions carry more weight than abstract references to “capacity building” or “sustainable connectivity”. Social media, local language platforms, and partnerships with regional influencers and media outlets can amplify these stories.
Public diplomacy should not be reduced to defensive rebuttals of criticism. It should convey a positive narrative of Europe as a long-term partner that combines economic openness, high standards, and respect for local agency; as a security actor that contributes to stability without demanding exclusive loyalties; and as a political union that, precisely because it is made up of diverse states, understands the difficulties of building consensus and managing differences peacefully.
Conclusion
A more competitive and fragmented international system is not inherently favourable to the European Union. If it continues to rely on slow procedures, vague objectives, and fragmented instruments, it will indeed risk becoming one of the main losers in the ongoing reconfiguration of power. Yet the same environment also offers the Union a chance to redefine its place in the world, provided it is willing to reform itself and commit resources and attention beyond its immediate neighbourhood.
In the Indo-Pacific, adopting a clear role conception, embracing strategic autonomy, reforming decision making, and developing a principles-based hedging strategy are essential internal steps. Externally, the Union must de-risk through diversified partnerships, adopt an outside-in mindset, support regional organisations, be visibly present, deepen security cooperation under a Team Europe approach, strengthen ties with key democracies, recalibrate the interplay of interests and values, and tell a more persuasive story about its contributions.
If these strands are woven together, the result will not be a perfect blueprint, but it can provide the basis for sustained, credible European engagement in a region that is central to the future shape of global order. Any such engagement inevitably builds on earlier analyses and initiatives, and it is important to recognise and acknowledge those intellectual and political foundations even as new approaches are developed.
